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The means of contest design may include differential taxation of the prize. This paper 
establishes that, given a revenue-maximizing contest designer who faces a balanced-budget 
constraint, the optimal taxation scheme corresponding to an all-pay auction is appealing in 
two senses. First, it ensures exceptional equitable final prize valuations.  Second, it is 
effective; it yields total contestants’ efforts that are larger than those obtained under almost 
any Tullock-type lottery. Furthermore, when a budget surplus is allowed, the superiority of 
optimal taxation under the APA is preserved in terms of equity and effectiveness relative to 
optimal taxation under any contest success function. 
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1. Introduction 
Applications of contest theory include promotional competitions, litigation, internal 
labor market tournaments, rent-seeking, R&D races, political and public policy 
competitions and sports, Konrad (2009), Congleton et al. (2008). Contest design may 
involve the endogenous determination of relevant institutional characteristics by 
contest designers; economic and political entrepreneurs who wish to maximize the 
total efforts made by the contestants. These characteristics may include various forms 
of discrimination between the contestants. In particular, discrimination can take the 
form of differential taxation of the contested prize.
1 Such taxation determines the 
actual stakes of the contestants from the prize, given their initial prize valuations. If an 
effort (revenue)-maximizing contest designer faces a balanced-budget constraint, 
then, by definition, if one contestant's possible winning of the prize is subjected to a 
tax, then the possible winning of the prize by another contestant must be associated 
with a negative tax, viz., the granting of a subsidy. In a two-contestant setting, optimal 
differential taxation (discrimination) may therefore result in an increase or a decrease 
in the gap between the contestants' stakes from the prize. The effect of the designer's 
preferred tax-subsidy scheme on the contestants' actual stakes from the prize hinges 
on the contest-success function (CSF) – the rule that determines the contestants’ 
chances of winning the prize, given their exerted efforts in trying to win the prize.
2 In 
light of the existing results in the contest literature, see Konrad (2009), one might 
intuitively expect that equalization of stakes is always the optimal strategy for a 
revenue-maximizing contest designer. Such expectation is plausible because equal 
stakes imply maximal competition that apparently induces the largest contestants' 
efforts, as in Gradstein (1995).  
  The first objective of this paper is to show that this expectation is indeed 
realized when the CSF is the widely used all-pay auction (APA). However, as will be 
shown, the fulfillment of this expectation under an APA is the exception rather than 
the rule. That is, in general, this seemingly plausible expectation is not fulfilled. This 
is the case when the CSF is the most commonly assumed lottery, Tullock (1980), and, 
in particular, the simple lottery that will be used to diagrammatically illustrate our 
                                                             
1 Alternative forms of discrimination via the control of the contest success function are examined in 
Clark and Riis (2000), Epstein et al. (2011a), (2011b), Franke (2007) , Franke et al. (2011) and Lien 
(1990). 
2 For a recent study on the meaning and rationalization of CSFs, see Corchon and Dahm (2010).   3
claim. Whereas stake equalization is optimal in the APA case, it is not optimal in the 
lottery case, although the optimal taxation scheme reduces the gap between the 
contestants' stakes from the prize, but does not eliminate it. The proof of the extreme 
equalitarian nature of optimal differential taxation under an APA has to deal with two 
possibilities. In the first possibility, the difference between the contestants’ stakes is 
mild and there is an inverse relationship between their taxes. Consequently, the use of 
the well known properties of the equilibrium strategies in an APA enables a 
straightforward proof. In contrast, in the second possibility, the asymmetry between 
the contestants’ prize valuations is large, the balanced budget constraint allows direct 
(not inverse) relationship between the taxes imposed on the contestants and, in turn, 
an increase in the sum of their prize valuations. This complicates matters and requires 
a different more subtle proof strategy. The challenge of clarifying the economic 
intuition behind the second part of the proof can nevertheless be met by applying 
standard microeconomic arguments. As we will show, the different more equalitarian 
nature of optimal taxation under the APA is due to the different relationship between 
the balanced-budget curve and the equi-effort curves under an APA and under a 
lottery. We also supplement the intuitive justification of the optimal taxation scheme 
under an APA and under a lottery with an economic interpretation. The proposed 
interpretation stresses the different role of leveling the playing field in attaining the 
maximal revenue via optimal taxation under these CSFs. 
  The second objective of the paper is to compare the appeal of the optimal 
differential taxation of the prize under the APA and any Tullock-type lottery in terms 
of their effectiveness as a means of revenue maximization for a contest designer who 
determines his preferred taxation scheme subject to a balanced-budget constraint. It 
turns out that optimal taxation yields larger revenue (total efforts) under the APA than 
under almost any lottery and, in particular, the simple lottery
3. Finally, we establish 
that optimal differential taxation under the APA is the most effective means of 
generating revenue when a budget surplus is allowed. 
  The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. In the next section we 
present the contest designer’s problem under the balanced-budget constraint. The 
                                                             
3 When the contestants stakes are given, the APA does not necessarily yield larger efforts than the 
simple lottery, as shown by Fang (2002),  Epstein et al. (2011b). In our setting where the stakes can be 
controlled, the efforts under the APA are always larger than or equal to those obtained under any 
lottery.   4
optimal taxation scheme under the APA is presented in Section 3 We clarify the 
economic intuition behind the proof of the first result establishing the superiority of 
the APA in terms of equity, by applying standard microeconomic arguments. The 
exceptional nature of the first result is clarified by contrasting it with the non-extreme 
equalitarian nature of optimal taxation under almost any Tullock-type lottery. The 
superior effectiveness of optimal taxation under the APA as a means of generating 
efforts is established in Section 4. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 5. The 
proofs of the three main results that deal with optimal taxation under a balanced-
budget constraint are relegated to an Appendix. 
 
2. The problem of the contest designer under a balanced-budget constraint 
In our contest there are two risk-neutral contestants, the high and low benefit 
contestants, 1 and 2. The prize valuations of the contestants are denoted by  1 n  and  2 n  







   and that the 
contest designer has complete information on the contestants’ prize valuations. Given 
the contestants’ fixed prize valuations and the CSF, the function  ) , ( 2 1 x x pi that 
specifies the contestants’ winning probability given their efforts  1 x  and  2 x , the 
expected net payoff (surplus) of contestant i is: 
 
(1)                            i i i i x n x x p u E   ) , ( 2 1 ,  (i=1,2) 
 
Direct discrimination via differential taxation of the contested prize that 
affects the contestants’ actual prize valuations,  1 n  and  2 n , is a pair of (positive or 
negative) amounts,  1   and  2   that changes the prize valuations to  1 1   n  and 
 2 2   n . A contest designer who applies such a taxation scheme must ensure that the 
transformed prize valuations are positive. Otherwise the contestants will not 
voluntarily take part in the contest and the designer’s revenue will be equal to zero. 
We also assume that the contest designer faces a balanced-budget constraint, that is, 
1   and  2   must also satisfy the requirement that the designer’s expected expenditures   5
are equal to zero, that is,  0 2 2 1 1     p p .
4 This ex-ante balanced-budget constraint is 
reasonable when the designer is "risk neutral" in the sense that he does not mind to 
face an ex-post deficit situation after the outcome of the contest has been revealed. 
The balanced-budget constraint is more plausible when the designer controls a series 
of identical contests that are held during a fixed period (typically weekly, monthly or 
quarterly contests that are held during the budget year). In such a case, the designer 
actually tries to ensure that during the relevant period the net transfers between the 
contestants are cancelled out such that his budget is balanced. 
In the optimal contest design setting, the objective function of the contest 
designer is: 
 
(2)       12 Gxx    
 
The designer maximizes his objective function (2) subject to the relevant constraints 
by selecting  1   and  2  , given the anticipated Nash equilibrium efforts of the 
contestants. The particular choice of the taxation scheme together with its 
corresponding efforts of the contestants, constitute the equilibrium of the game. The 
contest game that we study has therefore a two-stage structure. In the first stage the 
designer determines the taxation scheme. In the second stage the contestants make 
decisions on their exerted efforts taking as given the (positive and negative) taxes 
levied on the prize. 
 
3. The superiority of the APA in terms of equity 
Under the APA, the certain winner is the contestant who makes the largest effort. That 
is, the APA is given by: 
 














      if          0
      if       .5 0





x x p  
 
                                                             
4 The possibility of a balanced-budget constraint faced by the contest designer has not been dealt with 
in the contest literature. The possibility of caps on the contestants’ efforts has been examined, for 
example, by Che and Gale (1998), Ujhelyi (2009).   6
Given a tax scheme implemented by  1   and  2  , the two contestants maximize their 
expected payoffs: 
 
(4)       1 1 1 2 1 1 1 , x n x x p u E      and         2 2 2 2 1 1 2 , 1 x n x x p u E       
 
If the stake of contestant 1 is larger than or equal to the stake of contestant 2, that is, 
0 2 2 1 1       n n , then the optimal efforts of the contestants and their 
corresponding equilibrium winning probabilities are given, as is well known (see 
Konrad (2009)), by: 
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In turn, the objective function of the contest designer is: 
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The designer selects a taxation scheme   2 1,  such that he maximizes the 
contestants’ equilibrium efforts (6), subject to the balanced-budget constraint, 
0 2 2 1 1     p p . Since  0  i p ,  , 2 , 1  i  the budget constraint implies that  0 2 1    . 
Taking into account the equilibrium efforts of the contestants and assuming that 
0 2 2 1 1       n n
5, the balanced-budget constraint takes the form: 
 



































(8)                                0 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1            n n n  
                                                             
5 Later on we discuss the other possible case where  0 1 1 2 2       n n .   7
The designer’s problem is, therefore, given by:  
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Our first result specifies the optimal taxation scheme under the APA. 
  
Proposition 1: The optimal taxation scheme under the APA equalizes the contestants 
final stakes, that is,       2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Let us clarify the idea of the proof by using Figures 1 and 2 and the well 
known properties of the equilibrium strategies under the APA. First, notice that the 
balanced-budget constraint requires that a move from the initial situation involves 
opposite-sign changes in the contestants’ stakes and that  2 1 0      (the designer 
does not increase the stake of contestant 1 and reduce the stake of contestant 2 
because such a strategy increases the gap between the contestants’ stakes, so the 
intensity of the competition and, in turn, the contestants’ efforts are reduced).  
Two feasible taxation schemes are represented by points D and E. Obviously, 
the scheme  2 1,   represented by E that equalizes the contestants' final stakes is 
feasible (satisfies the balanced-budget constraint). Applying this strategy the designer 
imposes a tax (grants a subsidy) equal to half of the gap between the initial stakes on 
contestants 1 (to contestant 2) and this equalizes the winning probabilities of the 
contestants, so the balanced-budget constraint is indeed satisfied. This scheme 
generates larger efforts than the scheme      0 , 0 , 2 1     represented by D, because it 
increases the intensity of competition and, in turn, the contestants’ efforts. The 
feasible (potentially optimal) schemes for the designer are those represented by points 
on the curve connecting points D and E where    0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n . 
The crucial issue to which we now turn is the reason that the optimal taxation 
scheme is the equalitarian scheme represented by point E. To answer this question, we 
proceed by clarifying the properties of the equi-effort and balanced-budget curves.    8
A typical equi-effort  A G  curve is given by   
 1 1
2










G A . In the 
 2 1,   plane, this curve is positively-sloped since an increase in  1   reduces the 
intensity of competition and, in turn, the contestants’ efforts. To bring total effort back 
to its original level,  2  must be increased. Similarly, a reduction in the stake of 
contestant 1 or an increase in the stake of contestant 2 result in an increase in total 
effort. Four typical equi-effort curves 
A
A G , 
B
A G , 
C










A G G G G    ,  
are presented in Figures 1 and 2. These curves are positively-sloped and concave.  
As already noted, in the neighborhood of point D, the balanced-budget curve 
is negatively sloped. In addition, the curve is also concave. These properties imply 
that, in the relevant range where  0 2 2 1 1       n n , the balanced-budget curve can 
be always negatively sloped, as in Figure 1. In such a case, the optimality of the 
equalitarian tax scheme could be directly inferred from the equilibrium properties of 
the APA (see, for example, Baye et al. (1993), equation (10)) that imply that an 
increase of the lower stake or a decrease in the higher stake, viz., stake equalization, 
positively affect the total efforts. Alternatively, one could argue that in an all-pay 
auction equilibrium, the sum of the players’ expenditures is weakly less than the 
lower prize valuation  2 n . This follows from the players’ equilibrium mixed strategies, 
which are uniform on [0,  2 n ] . Thus, the optimal tax scheme maximizes the lower of 
the two players’ valuations, i.e., equates these valuations.  In fact, when the balanced-
budget curve is always negatively sloped, one can immediately realize that the 
optimal point cannot be interior and lie on the negatively-sloped part of the balanced-
budget curve because at such a point the positive slope of the equi-effort curve is 
larger than the negative slope of the balanced-budget curve, as at points A, B, C in 
Figure 1. Hence, the optimal point in Figure 1 is E.  
What complicates the proof, however, is the fact that, with sufficiently 
asymmetric players, the balanced-budget curve can also be positively sloped and have 
the typical shape depicted in Figure 2.
6 Note that in such a case the balanced-budget 
constraint enables a simultaneous increase in the contestants’ prize valuations and, in 
turn, an invrease in the sum of these valuations beyond the initial  ) ( 2 1 n n  . So the 
                                                             
6 As shown in the proof, the two possible shapes of the balanced-budget curve presented in Figure 1 
and in Figure 2 are, respectively, obtained when  3 1   k  and  3  k .   9
two alternative straightforward proofs based on the equilibrium properties of the APA 
or on the comparison of the positive and negative slopes of the equi-effort and 
balanced-budget curves can no longer be used. To face the challenge of this 
possibility, we prove that the optimal taxation scheme is represented by the extreme 
point E, and not by an interior tax scheme represented by a point between A and E in 
Figure 2, by establishing that, at any point in the positively-sloped part of the 
balanced-budget curve, the positive slope of the equi-effort curve is larger than the 
positive slope of the balanced-budget curve. In economic terms, at any point in the 
positively-sloped part of the balanced-budget curve, any move towards E has two 
contrasting effects on the intensity of competition; the reduction in the stake of 
contestant 1 increases the intensity of competition and, in turn, the contestants’ 
efforts, whereas the reduction in the stake of contestant 2 decreases the intensity of 
competition and, in turn, the contestants’ efforts. Since the former effect is dominant, 
any move toward E increases the contestants’ effort. That is, point E represents the 
optimal equalitarian taxation scheme. 
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In light of the existing results in the contest literature, see Konrad (2009), one 
may intuitively expect that equalization of stakes is always the optimal strategy for a 
revenue-maximizing contest designer. At first glance, such expectation is plausible 
because equal stakes imply maximal competition that apparently induces the largest 
efforts. Our next objective is to explain why the fulfillment of this expectation under 
an APA is the exception rather than the rule. The extreme nature of the APA results in 
an extreme optimal taxation scheme (the optimal point E is not interior). In contrast, 
optimal taxation under the widely studied lottery CSFs proposed by Tullock (1980), is 
not extreme; it reduces the gap between the contestants’ stakes, but does not eliminate 
it. A Tullock-type lottery is given by:  
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where  0   . The CSF is a simple lottery, apparently the most commonly assumed 
CSF in the rent-seeking literature, when  1   . In this case, a contestant’s probability 
of winning the contest is equal to his relative effort.  
Given a taxation scheme represented by  1   and  2  , the two contestants 
maximize their expected payoffs: 
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and the balanced-budget constraint takes the form 
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Note that constraints 2 and 3 guarantee that the contestants’ utilities are not negative 
as well as the fulfillment of the second-order conditions in the contestants’ 
maximization problems.
7 The solution of this problem yields our second result. 
 
Proposition 2: When  1  k ,  the  optimal  taxation  scheme  under  any  Tullock-type 
lottery with  2 0    does not equalize the contestants’ final stakes, but preserves 
their  relative  magnitude.  That  is,         2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n         and 
0 2 1    . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
That is, if the contestants’ initial stakes are different, then a designer who chooses a 
taxation scheme subject to a balanced-budget constraint does not have an incentive to 
eliminate the gap between the contestants' prize valuations and the reduced initially 
higher stake is still larger than the increased initially lower stake. To illustrate this 
result in a tractable geometric way, consider the special case of a simple lottery 
( 1   ) where the designer has an incentive to reduce the gap between the 
contestants’ stakes but not to eliminate it. The diagrammatic illustration of the typical 
interior equilibrium in this case appears in Figure 3. Whereas the typical shape of the 
balanced-budget curve is unchanged, the equi-effort curves are now negatively sloped 
and convex. Furthermore, at point A, which represents the equalitarian taxation 
scheme, the slope of the balanced-budget curve is larger than the slope of the equi-
effort curve. This implies that the point E, which represents the interior equilibrium 
taxation scheme, must be to the right of A. That is, the reduced stake of contestant 1 is  
 
                                                             
S See Epstein et al. (2011b).   13




still larger than the increased stake of contestant 2. The equalitarian taxation scheme 
represented by point A enables the designer to neutralize the initial difference in the 
contestants’ stakes and thus increase the intensity of competition and, in turn, the 
contestants’ efforts relative to the initial situation represented by point B. The move 
from point A to point E enables the designer to further increase the contestants’ 
efforts by fully taking advantage of the potential “income effect” associated with a 
scheme that increases the sum of the final stakes from ( ) 2 1 n n   at A to 
) ( 2 2 1 1      n n  at E (by Proposition 2, the optimal taxation scheme satisfies 
0 2 1    ). This positive income effect dominates the negative effect on total efforts 
due to the reduced competition associated with the creation of a gap between the 
contestants’ final stakes. 
1    
) ( 5 . 0 2 1 n n    
L G Max    
A   
   
2    
) ( 5 . 0 2 1 n n      1 5 . 0 n    
Balanced-budget 
constraint 
   
E   
B   
  
C   
E
1    
E
2    
2   Max   
A
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  It seems to us that Proposition 2 has significant implications in public 
economics.
8 In particular, it can be used to explain why contingent taxation of the 
prize won in a lottery contest between two lobbyists representing two interest groups, 
such as, the "rich" and the "poor" or "consumers" and a "monopoly", tends to preserve 
the initial ex-ante inequality between the interest groups represented by the lobbyists. 
Such applications certainly deserve further examination, which is beyond the scope of 
the current work.  
 
4. The superiority of the APA in terms of revenue maximization 
If the designer faces a balanced-budget constraint, then optimal taxation under the 
APA yields total efforts that are equal to the average of the initial stakes. These efforts 
are larger than those obtained under almost any Tullock-type lottery and, in any event, 
they are always larger than or equal to those obtained under any lottery. 
 
Proposition 3: The  total  efforts  of  the  contestants  corresponding  to  the  optimal 
taxation  scheme und er  the  APA  are equa l  to th e  average  prize  valuation, 
 2 1 5 . 0 n n GA   . These total efforts are larger than or equal to those obtained under 
any Tullock-type lottery with  2 0   .  
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
As shown in the proof, the maximal efforts under an APA can also be secured under a 
Tullock-type lottery with the exponent   being equal to 2. In other words, maximal 
performance of optimal differential taxation can be attained in the mixed-strategy 
equilibrium of the extreme logit CSF where      (the APA) or in the pure-strategy 
equilibrium of the extreme logit CSF where  2   . Note that such equivalence has 
the flavor of the neutrality result obtained in Alcalde and Dahm (2010). However, in 
our setting of contest design, the contestants' maximal efforts are larger than those 
obtained in the setting of Alcalde and Dahm (2010) because we allow discrimination 
between the contestants via the optimal scheme of differential taxation of the prize. 
                                                             
8 Applications in other disciplines, e.g., evolutionary biology, also seem natural because the assumption 
of contest resolution based on a lottery and the assumption of effort maximization (by nature) seem 
plausible.    15
Let us explain the intuition behind Proposition 3. For  1  k  and  2   , it can be 
verified that, at the point representing the optimal taxation scheme, the slope of the 
balanced-budget curve is still larger than the slope of the equi-effort curve. This 
means that the designer is aware of the kind of “income effect” described in the last 
paragraph of the preceding section. So why does not he take advantage of this effect 
and increase the contestants’ efforts by creating a gap between their final stakes (see 
Proposition 2). The reason is that, when the designer modifies the contestants’ prize 
valuations, he must be certain that his intervention preserves the contestants’ 
incentives to take part in the contest. When  2   , it is known that the existence of a 
pure-strategy equilibrium requires that the contestants’ stakes are equal. The designer 
must therefore equalize the stakes because otherwise the contestant with the lower 
prize valuation attains a negative utility, which prevents his participation in the 
contest. Hence, when the contestants’ stakes are equalized, despite the existence of 
the “income effect”, its application is not feasible; the utility of each contestant is 
equal to zero and any modification of the stakes by resorting to taxation will result in 
the withdraw of the lower-stake player from the contest and, in turn, in the reduction 
of the total efforts to zero. The above explanation implies that a change in the 
exponent of the lottery from  2    to  2    enables the designer to increase the 
contestants’ efforts by taking advantage of the “income effect” (note that for  2   , 
taxation that equalizes the stakes results in positive utility for both of the players). So 
how can  2    yield the maximal efforts    2 1 5 . 0 n n GL   . The answer to this 
question is that the move from equal stakes to non-equal stakes involves two negative 
effects that reduce the contestants’ efforts. First, the move implies reduced 
competition that reduces the contestants’ incentive to exert effort. Second, the 
reduction in   means that the impact of effort on the winning probability is reduced, 
and this effect also lowers the contestants’ incentive to exert effort. The combined 
negative effect more than counterbalances the positive “income effect” and this 
explains why the maximal efforts are attained at  2   .  
  Finally, suppose that the contestants’ participation in the contest is voluntary 
and the designer does not face a balanced-budget constraint and any surplus is 
allowed. The utility of the contest designer is now given by the contestants’ efforts 
and the net expected surplus in the budget used for the differential taxation of the 
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. When budget surplus is allowed, the 
sum of the contestants’ efforts and the surplus in the budget of the contest designer 
can be equal to the stake of contestant 1,  1 n .   The proof is straightforward. The 
designer can now reduce contestant 2’s stake to zero,  2 2 n    , and contestant 1’s 
stake almost to zero, 
   1 1 n  . Such a taxation scheme induces contestant 2 not to 
take part in the contest and contestant 1 to make a negligible effort, which guarantees 
his winning. The contestants’ efforts therefore converge to zero, the designer 
expropriates almost all the stake of contestant 1 so his benefit is equal to  1 n . This 
‘take it or leave it’ - type result has been obtained in the literature by applying 
different mechanisms. In the current study, it is obtained by resorting to optimal 
differential taxation of the prize. A similar result has been derived in Nti (2004) by 
applying a Tullock-type lottery and a transformation of the contestants’ efforts that is 
equivalent to the setting of a reservation effort  1 n  for contestant 1. If contestant 1’s 
effort is smaller than the reservation effort, then contestant 2 wins the contest. 
Alternatively, we could use a first-price APA with a reservation price of  1 n  (see 
Hillman and Riley, 1989). 
 
5. Conclusion 
As in a standard public finance context, taxation in a contest setting has efficiency and 
distributional implications. In this study efficiency (inefficiency) is measured in terms 
of the total efforts exerted by the contestants and the distributional effect is measured 
by the gap between the contestants’ relevant final prize valuations. 
Optimal contest design can be implemented by applying direct discrimination 
that affects the contestants’ prize valuations via differential taxation of the prize. 
Interestingly, when the contest designer faces a balanced-budget constraint, 
differential taxation of the prize under the APA is sufficient to secure the exertion of 
the largest efforts by the contestants, relative to optimal taxation under any Tullock-
type lottery. Such superiority is attained without resorting to structural discrimination 
that affects the parameters of the contest success function, as in Clark and Riis (2000), 
Epstein et al. (2011a), (2011b), Franke (2007), Franke et al. (2011) and Lien (1990), 
which may be difficult to control or even illegal. Furthermore, allowing taxation that   17
result in a budget surplus, the optimal differential taxation scheme under the APA 
generates the maximal possible total efforts, which are equal to the highest 
contestant’s value of the prize. 
Optimal taxation under the APA is also superior in terms of equity: equality of 
the contestants’ final prize valuations. When the contest designer faces a balanced-
budget constraint, optimal taxation under the APA eliminates the gap between the 
contestants’ initial prize valuations. Such equalization of the contestants’ stakes is an 
exception and not the rule. In fact, it is not obtained under almost any Tullock-type 
lottery and we conjecture that this finding is more general. That is, optimal taxation 
under any regular lottery that satisfies some standard properties closes the gap 
between the contestants’ stakes from the prize, but does not eliminate it. The 
economic rationale of this finding is due to the dominance of the positive “income 
effect” on total efforts, which is attained by taxation that increases the sum of the final 
stakes, over the negative “inequality effect”; the negative effect on total efforts of the 
preserved stake inequality, which implies giving up some potential extra competition 
between the contestants that could enhance the exertion of efforts. Note that the 
existence of the “income effect” in our strategic contest setting crucially depends on 
two assumptions: the initial difference between the contestants’ prize valuations and 
the balanced-budget constraint that enables taxation that can increase the initial sum 
of the contestants’ stakes. But, under the APA, these necessary assumptions are not 
sufficient to ensure the existence of a positive “income effect”. The reason is that in 
the case of an APA, the equi-effort curves are positively sloped and not negatively 
sloped as in the case of a lottery when the stakes are equalized. This means that an 
interior optimal taxation can only be obtained along the positively-sloped part of the 
balanced-budget constraint (see Figure 2). But in this range the optimal taxation 
scheme is not interior; it yields equal final stakes because any feasible alternative 
taxation scheme that involves a simultaneous increase of the equal stakes of the 
contestants negatively affects their total efforts. The increase in the stake of contestant 
1 reduces the intensity of competition and, in turn, the exerted efforts. This decline in 
the exerted efforts is moderated, but not neutralized or more than counter balanced, by 
the required increase in the stake of contestant 2 while moving along the positively-
sloped part of the balanced-budget curve. In other words, in the case of an APA, when 
the contestants’ stakes are equalized, the “income effect” (the effect on total efforts of 
the increase in the sum of the contestants’ stakes) is negative. So the designer prefers   18
the equalitarian corner solution. Finally, we have shown that when a surplus is 
allowed in the contest designer’s budget, again, optimal taxation under the APA 
almost eliminates the gap between the contestants’ initial prize valuations; the prize of 
one contestant is reduced to zero and the prize of the other contestant is reduced to a 
positive value slightly higher than zero. 
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Proposition 1: The optimal taxation scheme under the APA equalizes the contestants 
final stakes, that is,       2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       . 
Proof: The proof includes three parts. We first clarify the properties of the feasible 
(potentially equilibrium) strategies   2 1,  . For these strategies, we describe in Part 2 
the properties of the balanced-budget constraint (bbc). We then present in the third 
part the properties of an equi-effort curve and by comparing its slope to that of the 
balanced-budget curve complete the proof.  
Part 1: Let us show that in equilibrium, if  1  k , then     0 , 0 , 2 1     and if  1  k , 
then   2 1 2 1 0 5 . 0        n n . 
































n GA  and, by the bbc, 
0 2 1    , considering a deviation from     0 , 0 , 2 1    , the designer does not have an 
incentive to reduce  2   (so  0 2   ) or increase  1   (so  0 1   ). That is, in any 
equilibrium,  2 1 0      must be satisfied. 
  When  1  k  ( 2 1 n n n   ), by (6), for     0 , 0 , 2 1    , the total efforts are 






. It can be easily verified, by (6), that any alternative feasible 
taxation scheme attains smaller efforts. Henceforth we therefore assume that  1  k . 





and for the feasible stake-equalizing scheme 
      2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       , the total efforts are equal to    2 1 5 . 0 n n  . Since, 









   , we can conclude that    0 , 0 , 2 1     does not 
maximize the contestants’ efforts. Hence, for  1  k , in equilibrium,  2 1 0     .  
  Let us complete the proof of Part 1 (establish that, in equilibrium, 
 1 2 1 5 . 0     n n ) by showing that when   2 1 1 1 5 . 0 n n n       , the 
corresponding efforts cannot be maximal.    21
Let        2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n
E E        be our benchmark taxation scheme, 
where    2 1 2 2 1 1 5 . 0 n n n n
E E        , efforts are equal to 
 2 1
1 1



















































Starting from this scheme, let us reduce  1   below    2 1 5 . 0 n n    and show that such a 
change reduces the  efforts, independent of the balanced-budget constraint:
9 
























GA , and  2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2            n n n n
E E . 
Therefore, 
2 2
























 and, consequently, the 
move from 
E
A G  to the new  A G  reduces the efforts. 
























GA  and  1 1 1 1 2 2         n n n
E E . Therefore, 
2 2
























 and consequently the move from 
E
A G  to 
the new  A G  reduces the total efforts. 
 
Part 2: In this part we examine the properties of the bbc for the relevant schemes 
satisfying   2 1 2 1 0 5 . 0        n n . The bbc can be written as 
   0 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2
2
2       n n n      . Since  2 1 0     , the solution of this 
equation must be the positive root. That is: 





2 1 1 1
2
1 2 2 1
1 2
n n n n      

   
  . 
A taxation scheme  2 1,   that satisfies the bbc has the following properties: 
a.   0 2 2 1 1       n n  iff         2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       . 
b. If  0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n , then    0 2 2 1 1       n n . 
                                                             
9 In this range, it is possible that the contestant who initially has the higher stake becomes the one with 
the lower stake and then, under the balanced-budget constraint (8), the roles of contestants 1 and 2 are 
reversed. Therefore, the constraint (8) is no longer applicable.     22



















The proof of property a is straightforward and therefore omitted.  
To prove property b, note that in the range    0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n  on the bb-
curve, only in the extreme point where    2 1 1 5 . 0 n n     , the contestants’ stakes are 
equal, that is,  2 2 1 1      n n . In the other extreme point where  0 1   , 
2 2 1 1      n n . Hence, by the continuity of the bbc (A.1), for every  1  , 
0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n , we get that  2 2 1 1      n n .  
To prove property c, notice that according to (A.1), the slope of the bb-curve is: 
(A.2)          
5 . 0
2 1 1 1
2
1 2 1 1 2
1
2 2 4 7 4 5 . 0 5 . 0

       








      
    0 2 4 5 . 3
2 4 7 4 5 . 0
5 . 0
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n n n n n
  




Substituting  0 1    in (A.2), we get that  0 2 1
1







Let us, finally, find out what is the value of  1   that yields the maximal value 







 and for 














.  By (A.3), the 
function  ) ( 1 2    defining the bb-curve is concave in the relevant range 
0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n . Therefore, for  3  k ,  ) ( 1 2    has a negative slope at  0 1   , a 
positive slope at   2 1 1 5 . 0 n n      and a zero slope at some intermediate value  1  , 








 for any  1  ,   0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n . That is, the bb-curve is declining in the 
relevant domain and the maximal value of    2 1 2 5 . 0 n n     is obtained at 
 2 1 1 5 . 0 n n    .     23
 For  3  k  and  0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n , an increase in  1   is always associated 














, we directly get that the   
maximal efforts are obtained in the equalitarian scheme 
     2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       .  But when  3  k  and    0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n , an 
increase in  1   can be associated with an increase in  2  . The optimality of the 
equalitarian tax scheme needs therefore to be proved taking into account also this 
possibility (an increasing bb-curve). The third part of the proof establishes the 
optimality of        2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n        also in this case.  
 














G A . Let us show that the function    1 2    that defines 

















. Differentiating the 
function   1 2    we get  0





























































































































































. Given the 
properties of the bb-curve and the ee-curve, we will complete the proof by showing 
that, for  0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n , where,  2 2 1 1      n n  (see Part 2), at every point 

















































We have to show that     
 2 2 1













, where the LHS (RHS) 
expression is the slope of the ee-curve (bb-curve). This inequality can be equivalently 
written as    
 2 2 2 1
1 2 2 1 1
2 2 2
2 1   
  
  






. Dividing the nominator and 
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. Since the denominator of the RHS 































. After some algebraic manipulations, this 
inequality takes the form: 
      0 2 1 2
1




2    












 b  (which has been calculated above) in all the terms in the 
above inequality with the exception of   
2 1 b b  , we get after some algebraic 























































































b b .  Since    0 5 . 0 1 2 1      n n , 





















 (because  2 1 0     ) and  0  b , we get that, for 





























b b .         Q.E.D 
 
Proposition 2: When  1  k   the  optimal  taxation  scheme  under  any Tullo ck-type 
lottery with  2 0    does not equalize the contestants’ final stakes, but preserves 
their  relative  magnitude.  That  is,         2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n         and 
0 2 1    .
11 
Proof: The proof is based on three lemmas. 
 
Lemma 1: For  2 0   , the total efforts obtained in the designer’s problem, (16), 
satisfy: 
a. For any  2 1,  ,  

 2 2 1 1 2











n n a . 
b. For the equilibrium taxation scheme  
E E



















Proof of Lemma 1: 


























, the maximal value of 
c, which is equal to 0.25, is reached at  1  a  (notice that the second order condition is 









). Hence, for any   2 1,  : 


 2 2 1 1 2













b. The selection of        2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       , which satisfied all the 
constraints in the designer’s problem (16), yields total efforts that are equal to 
 2 1 25 . 0 n n   . Hence,   

2














.           Q.E.D   
                                                             
11 For  1  k , it can be shown that in equilibrium     0 , 0 , 2 1    .    26
 
Lemma 2: In equilibrium, for  2 0    and  1  k ,  2 1 0     . 
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof consists of two steps. 
Step 1 - Since  0  i p ,  2 , 1  i , the balanced-budget constraint (14) implies that 
0 2 1    . Let us first show that  2 1 0     . Suppose to the contrary that, in 
equilibrium, the inequalities  2 1 0      are not satisfied. Since  0 2 1    , this implies 
that  1 2 0      and, therefore, after the change in the contestants’ stakes, the stake of 










a . By the balanced-budget 
constraint (15),  1 1 2   
     a  and using the result  1  a , we get that 
1 1 2   
     a  or  0 2 1    . The total efforts, even if constraints 2 and 3 in the 
designer’s problem (16) are disregarded, are not larger than    2 2 1 1 25 . 0       n n . 
Clearly, under the constraints 2 and 3, the total contestants’ efforts cannot be larger 
than this amount. Since  0 2 1    , the equilibrium total efforts are smaller than 
 2 1 25 . 0 n n   . But this contradicts part (b) of Lemma 1, which implies that the 
assumption  1 2 0      cannot be true. Hence,  2 1 0     . 
Step 2 - Let us prove that for  1  k ,     0 , 0 , 2 1     is not optimal. Together with the 
conditions established in step 1,  2 1 0     , this will complete the proof establishing 
that, in equilibrium,  2 1 0     . Let us then show that the selection of 
      2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n        is superior to the selection of    0 , 0 , 2 1    , 
that is,  

 2 1 2












. This latter inequality is equivalent to 

2
1 0  
 k , which is always satisfied since  1  k .             Q.E.D 
 
Lemma 3: An equi-effort curve  L G  is defined by 
    
   
2
2 2 1 1




    
  
    

n n
n n n n
G L . 
a. If  1  k , then at the point representing        2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       , 







 is equal to  1  .   27
(2)  In the margin, an increase in  i  ,    2 , 1  i , increases total efforts. 







 is larger than  1  . 










a  (the stake of contestant 
1 (2) is reduced (increased), but the final stake of 1 is still larger than that of 2) 
and therefore  0 2 1    . 
Proof of Lemma 3: 
a.(1) and a.(2). Given an equi-effort curve  L G .  

        
       
   
4
2 2 1 1
2 2 1 1 1 1
1
1 1 2 2 1 1
2
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   

 
      
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or, after some simplification, 













    
 a
a a a a a a G L  
In a similar way we get that 




1 1 1 1






    
 a
a a a a G L  
The slope of an equi-effort curve is therefore equal to 
   
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. This means that in the neighborhood of 
      2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       , an equi-effort curve is negatively sloped and an 
increase in  1   or in  2   increases the total efforts (an increase in total efforts shifts an 
equi-effort curve upward in the  ) , ( 2 1    plane).    28
a.(3) From the implicit form of the balanced-budget constraint (15) we get that 
  0 2 2 2 1 1 1        
  n n . Therefore, the slope of the balanced-budget curve is 
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therefore, the slope at         2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n        is 

 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
1
2
n n n n










. Since     2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 n n n n n n n n          , the 










b. Let us show that a move from         2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       , where  1  a , 
that involves a marginal increase in  1  , which preserves the balanced-budget 
constraint, increases total efforts. This will prove that, in equilibrium,  1  a .  
 A  marginal  change  in  1  a , which is due to a marginal increase in  1   that 
preserves the balanced-budget constraint, still satisfies constraints 2 and 3 in the 
designer’s problem (16), because at  1  a  these constraints are satisfied as strict 
inequalities ( 0 2   ). By Lemma 3 part (a), at the point which represents 
















starting from this point, a marginal increase in  1   accompanied by the required 
change in  2  , such that the balanced-budget curve is still satisfied, increases the total 
efforts. Note that if the slope of the balanced budget curve is positive (not positive) an 
increase (a decrease) in  2   is required. We have shown then that  1  a . Let us show 
that, in equilibrium,  1 ) 0 (   a  is impossible. Suppose to the contrary that  1  a . By 
Lemma 2,  2 1 0     , the balanced-budget constraint,  0 2 1   
 a and the 
assumption  1  a , we get that  1 1 2   
     a  or  0 2 1    . By Lemma 1 part (a), 
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 2 2 1 1 2











n n a . Since  0 2 1    , 
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 2 1 2












. But this contradicts the second part of Lemma 
1. We therefore obtain that the assumption  1  a  cannot be satisfied. In equilibrium, 
then  1  a  and  1  a  cannot be satisfied. That is,  1  a . By the balanced-budget 
constraint we get that  1 1 2   
     a  and this proves the second part of Proposition 
2, that is,  0 2 1    .                  Q.E.D 
 
Proposition 3: The  total  efforts  of  the  contestants  corresponding  to  the  optimal 
taxation  scheme und er  the  APA  are equa l  to th e  average  prize  valuation, 
 2 1 5 . 0 n n GA   . These total efforts are larger than or equal to those obtained under 
any Tullock-type lottery with  2 0   . 
Proof:  The proof will use the following lemma and its consequences. 
 
Lemma 4: In equilibrium, for  2 0   , 
a.  2 1 0     . 
b.  1  a  and, therefore,  0 2 1    . 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
a. See step 1 in the proof of Lemma 2. 
b. Let us show that, in equilibrium,  1 ) 0 (   a  is impossible. Suppose to the contrary 
that  1  a . This means that  2 1 0     . That is, the weak inequalities obtained in the 
first part of the lemma cannot be satisfied as equalities because such equalities mean 
that  0 2 1     and so  1
2
1    k
n
n
a , which contradicts the assumption  1  a . By 
the balanced-budget constraint,  0 2 1   
 a , the assumption  1  a  and the 
conclusion that  2 1 0     , we get that  1 1 2   
     a  or  0 2 1    . This latter 
inequality means that the equilibrium efforts are smaller than    2 1 25 . 0 n n   , which 
contradicts part (b) of Lemma 1.                   Q.E.D 
 
Recall that by Lemma 1 part (a), for  2 0   ,   30
(1.A)           

 2 2 1 1 2













Suppose now that the designer wishes to maximize the total efforts 
 2 2 1 1 0.25       n n . That is, he faces the problem:  
(2.A)       
   

0     . 6
0     . 5
0 2     . 4
0 1 1     . 3
0 1     . 2






































n n x x Max
 
Let us show that the maximal efforts for this problem are equal to   2 1 5 0. n n  . Since 
this amount can be attained by a Tullock-type lottery with  2    (see Lemma 1 part 
(b)), inequality (1.A) implies that the maximal efforts under a Tullock-type lottery is 
also   2 1 5 0. n n  , which will complete the proof of Proposition 3. 
Consider problem (2.A) and let  1  k .
13 Since, by Lemma 4 part (b), in 
equilibrium,  1  a . The fulfillment of the constraint  1  a  and constraint 4 imply that 
constraint 2 is also satisfied. We can therefore omit constraint 2 and add the constraint 
0 1  a  to obtain the following equivalent designer’s problem:  
 (3.A)    
   

0     . 6
0     . 5
0 1     . 4
0 2     . 3
0 1 1     . 2




































n n x x Max
 
The Lagrangian function is: 
                                                             
13 For  1  k , it can be shown that for every   satisfying  2 0   , in equilibrium,    0 , 0 , 2 1    . 
This implies that in this case the designer will choose  2    and that total efforts will be equal to those 
obtained under the APA, that is , n n n   2 1 . This also implies that for  2 0   , total efforts do not 
exceed  n n n   5 . 0 25 . 0 2 1   , which is smaller than n.       31
      
   1 2
1 1 25 . 0
3 2
1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1
   
        
a
a a n n L
  
       
 
 
and, in addition, by Lemma 4 part (a), in equilibrium,  2 1 0      and  0 2 1    . 
The following Kuhn-Tucker conditions must therefore be satisfied: 
0 2 1   
 a  
   0 1 1 1   
   a       0 1 1   
  a      0 1    
 0 2 2         0 2        0 2    






























































































     0 ln 1 ln 25 . 0 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1          


      














Suppose that, in equilibrium,  2   , so  0 2   . In this case, in equilibrium,  1  a  
(see Lemma 3 part (b)) and, therefore,  0 3   . Given these requirements, let us 
consider the following two possibilities:  
Possibility 1:  0 1 1   
  a . In this case,  0 1    and we therefore get that: 
























(5.A)      0 ln 25 . 0 1 1 2 2 1 1      


a a n n
L
   

  
By (4.A), since  2 1 0     , we get that: 

















and, by (5.A), we get that: 
(7.A)      a a n n ln 25 . 0 1 1 2 2 1 1    
         32
Since, in equilibrium,  0 2 1    (Lemma 4 part (b)), the LHS expression in (7.A) is 
positive, so the RHS expression must be positive. Since  2 1 0      and  1  a  
(Lemma 4 part (a) and lemma 3 part (b)),  0 1   , because otherwise the RHS in (7.A) 
equals zero. But this implies that if   a a ln 1 1  
   is positive, then  0 1    (since 
0 1    and  0 ln  a ), which contradicts inequality (6.A). We have thus obtained that, 
in equilibrium,  2    and  0 1 1   
  a  cannot hold. 
Possibility 2:   0 1 1   
  a  (recall that we have assumed that  2    and, 
therefore,  1  a ). Note that this possibility requires that  1    and that 









































(9.A)        
1
1 2 1
        
By (8.A) and (9.A), we get the taxation scheme   2 1,  : 








































Let us show that, in equilibrium, this taxation scheme is impossible. From (9.A) we 
get that   0 1 1 2        and, therefore,    0 2 2 1 2          or          2 2 2 1 . 
We therefore get that: 
(11.A)                     2 25 . 0 25 . 0 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 n n n n  
Notice that the selection of        2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n        and  2    satisfies 
all the constraints in (3.A) and yield total efforts that are equal to    2 1 5 . 0 n n  . Let us 
show that the total efforts in our case are smaller than this amount and this 
contradiction would imply that the assumption that, in equilibrium,   0 1 1   
  a , 
together with  2   , is impossible. Given (11.A), we have to show that 
    2 1 2 2 1 5 . 0 2 25 . 0 n n n n         . This latter inequality can be written as 
           2 2 2 1 2 n n  and since  2 1   , we have to prove that, in 
equilibrium,  2 1 2 n n    .   33
By substituting  2  , see (10.A), in the last inequality we get that we have to 



































1 1 1 1
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   
Finally, let us prove inequality (12.A) by showing that the coefficient of  1 n  in the 

















 1 1 1
1
1 1
   

      or     1 1 1 1
1 1
            or  1 1
1
    . Since 
2 1   ,the last inequality is satisfied and, therefore, inequality (12.A) is also 
satisfied. 
The conclusion from the two possibilities is that, in equilibrium,  2   . By 
constraints 2 and 4 in problem (3.A), this implies that  1  a . Therefore, by the 
balanced-budget constraint, we get that  0 2 1     and, since  1  a , we get that, in 
equilibrium,        2 1 2 1 2 1 5 . 0 , 5 . 0 , n n n n       . The maximal total efforts are 
therefore equal to   2 1 5 . 0 n n  . That is, for any  ,  2 1   , the maximal efforts are 
smaller than   2 1 5 . 0 n n  .               Q.E.D 
  
 